Seats and votes
this bipolarization of Fiji's politics was, at least to some degree, a response to the electoral experience in 1999 and 2001. in 1999, the Fijians had been split, enabling the mainly indian-backed Flp to secure a landslide victory. in 2001, the long-standing split in the indian vote between the Flp and national Federation party (nFp), and centrist parties ranking the Flp in last position, were sufficient to hand the predominantly indigenous Fijian-backed SDl the largest number of seats.
in 2006, the indian parties settled their differences and exchanged preferences with each other, while the ethnic Fijian parties formed a 'Grand coalition' spearheaded by former constitutional review commissioner tomasi Vakatora.
3 the middle ground in Fiji's politics had so diminished that centrist preferences decided fewer outcomes in 2006 than they did in 1999 or 2001, although some contests were so close that even these small shares of votes delivered the margin of victory.
of the registered voters, 53 per cent were ethnic Fijian and 43 per cent were indian, reflecting an ongoing shift in the demographic balance towards the indigenous community.
4 the 2006 indian turnout (88.7 per cent) was slightly above that of the indigenous Fijian community (87 per cent), but the share of invalid ballots was slightly higher among indians (9.4 per cent) than among indigenous Fijians (8.7 per cent). in the General communal constituencies, both turnout and invalid voting were lower than average (83.9 and 6.8 per cent respectively). turnout was notably lower than average in the Fijian urban communal constituencies, and in many of the urban open constituencies. nevertheless, at 87.7 per cent, the overall average turnout was well up on 2001 levels (79.1 per cent). A total of 1,778,900 ballot papers, including 120,000 for postal votes, were produced, although there were only 479,693 registered voters. each eligible voter has two votes and thus needs two ballot papers, bringing the required total ballot papers to 959,386. Additional ballot papers were required because, under the new compulsory voting system, voters may cast their ballots in any polling station within their communal constituency, so where they may choose to vote is uncertain. even bearing in mind that need for additional ballot papers, however, that nearly twice as many ballot papers were in circulation as were required generated problems of administration. Figure 21 .2). claims of a likely muslim rebellion or north/South indian schisms denting the Flp vote proved false, as they had in 1999 and 2001. So, too, did the notion, repeating the 1970's illusions of ratu mara's Alliance party, that the ruling SDl might make substantial advances in the indian communal constituencies, or even gain three indian seats. imraz iqbal, former Fiji tV personality and SDl deputy campaign manager, who featured prominently in SDl tV propaganda, obtained only 222 votes in nasinu, a seat easily taken by veteran Flp frontbencher Krishna Datt. overall, the SDl obtained only 2 per cent of the indian vote, indicating a negligible level of indian support for the governing party.
the national Federation party (nFp), under the leadership of jai ram reddy, had been the largest of the indian parties in the 1990s. But it slumped to 32 per cent of the indian communal vote in 1999, and on down to 22 per cent in 2001. the nFp's Sugar cane Growers' Association had long been fighting a losing battle with mahendra chaudhry's national Farmers' union for the hearts and minds of the cane farmers. in the 1990s, the nFp's strength had been in some of the urban areas, but out-migration by middle class professionals led to an erosion of the party's support base. continuing changes in the party leadership, and association with prominent Gujarati businessmen, lost the party support amongst the descendents of indentured labourers.
6 the nFp also suffered from being left without seats in 1999 and 2001, and thus lacked candidates with extensive parliamentary experience. it had increasingly to make appeals to past glories. in 2006, the party gained only 14.6 per cent of the indian vote, despite having strategically given strong preferences to the Flp in the hope of avoiding electoral annihilation. As in 1999 and 2001, the nFp was left with no seats in parliament. As a result, the Flp consolidated its claim to be the majority indian party, leaving the nFp reliant on its base in the municipal councils and among older unionised cane farmers if leaders opt for some kind of nocturnal survival.
the ruling SDl was able to mirror the Flp's performance in the indian constituencies, taking out all 23 of the Fijian communal seats at the first count. Back in 2001, Qarase's party had faced more powerful rivals, both to the west and in the east. then, the SDl was troubled by those provincial schisms that frequently prevent Fijian parties from sustaining homogeneous ethnic support. localized vanua ties, and rivalries based on the struggle over hereditary titles, often underpin contests between indigenous candidates in a way that differs markedly from the more ideologically based differences that define indian politics.
Yet, in 2006, the SDl secured close to 80 per cent of the Fijian vote, well up on the 50 per cent it had received in 2001 (see Figure 21. 3), and, again unlike 2001, its vote share was reasonably steady across the country. only in rewa and Ba east Fijian communal constituencies did SDl candidates face strong opposition. in rewa, ro teimumu Kepa saw off the challenge from her nephew, ro Filipe tuisawau, who stood as an independent after having been unsuccessful in securing the official SDl nomination (see Saumaki, this volume). in Ba east Fijian communal, the threatened re-emergence of a Western Viti levu-based Fijian party was thwarted, despite the vanishing act by the 2001 SDl front party in the west, the Bai Kei Viti (see Bose and Fraenkel, this volume) . on Kadavu, jim Ah Koy, the sitting member during the rabuka years and a major financier of development projects on the island, stood as an independent, but failed to stop the SDl's Konisi Yabaki retaining the seat with 74.4 per cent of the vote. even relative newcomers to politics, as long as they stood on an SDl ticket, were able to defeat sitting members or veteran politicians. the Fijian nationalist party performed poorly at the 2006 election. it had commanded 25 per cent of the indigenous vote at the polls in April 1977, and remained a small, but significant, force through the 1990s. under the leadership of Sakeasi Butadroka, the party had been the standard-bearer of the Fijian extremist cause, even at one point calling for the expulsion of the country's indian population. the renamed nationalist Vanua lavo tako party (nVtlp) managed 9.1 per cent of the vote in 1999, but thereafter it faded. After the 2000 coup, the emergence of the conservative Alliance-matanitu Vanua (cAmV) party, led by cakaudrove chief ratu naiqama lalabalavu and counting imprisoned failed coup leader George Speight as one of its mps, resulted in an eclipse of the nVtlp. it obtained only 1. the strength of party affiliations in determining vote shares was evident even in the general communal constituencies -where those other than the ethnic Fijians, indians and rotumans vote. Sitting member in the Suva city General seat, Kenneth Zinck -who crossed the floor to join the Qarase government after the 2001 poll, but who rejected the offer of an SDl ticket for the 2006 poll -obtained only third position behind the SDl's Aca lord. the major political parties fought more fiercely for the General Voter and rotuman constituencies than at previous elections. nevertheless, it was only in these that independents or smaller parties stood any chance. the Suva city General seat was taken by Bernadette rounds Ganilau, a popular former radio show host and member of the united peoples party (upp). mick Beddoes, the upp leader, narrowly won in the Western/central General communal constituency, and the third and final General communal seat was taken by an independent, robin irwin, whose anti-labour economic philosophy led him to align himself with the SDl. the upp had entered a pre-election coalition with mahendra chaudhry's Flp, signalling a major turnaround for the historically Fijian-allied General voter parties.
The battle for the open seats
Because all the Fijian and indian communal seats were divided between the two major parties, the ultimate election outcome was inevitably decided in the 25 open constituencies, as had been the case in 1999 and 2001. Yet, this time around, the fracturing of the Fijian vote witnessed in 1999 was no longer in evidence, rendering impossible a repetition of one of the critical elements in the Flp success at that previous election. on the indian side, the long-standing two-party Flp/nFp divide no longer had the same potential influence as in 2001, when nFp's across-the-board ranking of the Flp as last preference gave the SDl several crucial marginal open constituencies. in the run up to the 2006 poll, the nFp entered negotiations with the SDl and was offered seats in the Senate as the price for favouring the governing party. Yet, shortly before the deadline for party preferences to be lodged with the elections office, the party mended its fraught relationship with Flp leader mahendra chaudhry. the two parties signed a memorandum of understanding in which the nFp promised the Flp superior preferences to the SDl in seven of the ten potentially marginal open constituencies.
7 SDl leaders and newspaper editorials fumed at the nFp betrayal, calling the party 'liu muri' (figuratively translating to 'lowly and untrustworthy' 8 ), but the governing party nevertheless gained two seats thanks to nFp preferences. the nFp strategy had been to avoid giving 'blanket preferences' to either of the major parties, in the hope that, in that way, with one or two seats, it might hold the balance of power. the dashed horizontal line in Figure 21 .4, at the 50 per cent mark, shows the share of the vote required to secure victory under Fiji's AV system. the grey sloping line shows a projected Flp 80 per cent of the indian vote, and indicates the seats that the Flp could be expected to take at the first count (from Vuda rightwards to Ba -those electorates where the grey 80 per cent line is above the horizontal 50 per cent threshold). the black sloping line shows a projected SDl 80 per cent of the Fijian vote, and those seats which the SDl could be expected to take at the first count (Bua/macuata leftwards to tailevu north/ovalau). in the middle of the chart are the marginal open seats, where most results were always likely to depend on transfers of preference votes (Yasawa/nawaka through to Suva city).
As Figure 21 .5 indicates, results corresponded fairly closely with the model shown in Figure 21 .4. Figure 21 .5 shows the 25 open constituencies, again ordered from right to left in accordance with the ratio of indians to Fijians among registered voters. the block at the base of each column shows the ultimate victor's first preference votes, and additional blocks above the base block show transferred preference votes that were required to take the victor over the 50 per cent threshold (shown by the horizontal line). owing to ethnically based voting, all the seats to the right of the chart were taken by the Flp at the first count, and all those to the left of the chart were taken by the SDl. the only constituency towards the left of the chart that went beyond the first count was Serua/navosa open, a large, highly dispersed and mountainous constituency on the southwestern side of Viti levu. this was a contest complicated by the fact that the sitting member, pio Wong, had been de-selected by the SDl in favour of newcomer jone navakamocea, a civil servant previously employed in the prime minister's office. navakamocea eventually won, at the 7th count, and only then because the nFp ranked the SDl (6th) above the Flp (7th) in its preferences. negative ranking, and victory for the penultimate placed party, featured in 2006 -as it had done in 1999 and 2001, even though the number of seats decided on preferences was considerably lower than at those previous elections.
in both 1999 and 2001, 18 open constituencies were decided by transfer of preference votes. this time around, only nine were decided in this way. the middle ground of Fiji's politics was much smaller than it had been in 1999 and 2001, due to the decline in the nFp's indian vote and the weak performance of ratu epeli Ganilau's nApF. it was in those constituencies shown towards the centre of Figure 21 .4, where Fijians and indians approach parity in electorates, that results were so close that minor party preferences decided outcomes. these close-to-parity open constituencies are mostly located in the Suva-nausori corridor, where urban drift by evicted indian tenant farmers had spawned SDl fears that the Flp might do well.
9 Yet, Fijians as well as indians had moved towards the towns, and continued overseas migration countered the indian influx. outcomes thus remained highly uncertain in these parts of southeast remarkable was that, for the first time, below-the-line voting made a major difference in highly marginal open constituencies. Across the country as a whole, the vast majority of voters -as in 1999 and 2001 -ticked their ballot papers above-the-line. in so doing, they endorsed their first choice party's list of preferences that had earlier been lodged with the elections office. Yet, in all three elections, around 5-8 per cent of voters chose to rank candidates 'belowthe-line'. in most elections, the big blocks of above-the-line votes commanded by the parties make the overwhelming difference -a feature strongly condemned by even some of the greatest enthusiasts for Fiji's AV system. But in this election, results were so close in the 10 marginal open constituencies that in some cases, below-the-line votes decided outcomes. this was not the result of voters marking ballots below-the-line to any greater extent than previously. For example, in laucala open, where marking the ballot paper in this way decided the outcome in favour of the SDl's losena Salabula, who won by only 11 votes, only 3.5 per cent of ballots were cast below-the-line. under Fiji's previous first-past-the-post system, monolithic ethnically based parties also emerged. then, as with AV after 1997, communal seats tended to give each party a number of 'safe' seats and contests were decided in the common roll or 'national' open constituencies where the two ethnic groups approached parity.
11 in these, minor splits in the vote on either side, or slight variations in turnout, could decide outcomes one way or the other. parties sought to sustain homogeneous ethnic backing from their own group, while hoping for -or actively fomenting -splits amongst parties representing the other group. 12 Such splinter parties were more common among Fijians than among indians (owing to the greater importance of provincial or hierarchical ties for Fijians), encouraging a repeated emphasis on 'Fijian unity' in the run up to general elections.
the new AV system potentially lessened the danger of party splintering, in the sense that it allowed like-minded parties to field separate candidates but exchange second preferences. this, after all, had been the rationale behind the original introduction of the system in Australia in 1918.
13 in Fiji, however, the split format (above-the-line and below-the-line) ballot paper, and the fact that around 95 per cent of voters tended to tick above-the-line, gave political parties extraordinary control over preference votes. parties tend to strategize more than voters.
14 Where they are battling for the support of specific sections of the electorate, they will often do everything possible to destroy close rivals. the Flp, for example, put the nFp as last preference in 1999 because they were fighting for pre-eminence in the indian electorates, and the nFp reciprocated in 2001. Fijian splinter parties put rabuka's SVt as last preference in 1999. in 2001, the two western Viti levu parties (the Bai Kei Viti and party of national unity) each put the other as last preference, ensuring their mutual destruction and the victory of the SDl in the west.
As a result of this tactical usage of preferences, the type of party strategizing witnessed under the 1970 constitution applied also under the new electoral system, but with increased potency. Fomenting splits in the other camp no longer simply made possible plurality victories. it also created the potential for actually acquiring the splinter votes of breakaway parties. the pressures for 'ethnic unity' were thus just as acute, if not more so, under the new system. in ethnically bipolar circumstances, all single-member district-based systems tend to encourage the types of strategic dynamics witnessed in Fiji in 1970-87 and 1999-2006 . in contrast, multi-member district-based proportional systems diminish the electoral incentive for 'ethnic unity'. party shares of the vote determine party shares of seats, although there are various different ways of accomplishing this.
15 there may still be some pressure to avoid the emergence of small splinter parties if, as is commonly the case, there is a threshold below which small parties do not acquire seats. otherwise, there are fewer disincentives to the emergence of multiple parties. if ethnicity remains the crucial issue, nothing stops different political parties aligning along racial lines within parliament. no electoral system can abolish ethnically based voting. Guyana, for example, uses list proportional representation, but has two robust ethnic parties representing the indo-and Afro-Guyanese. What proportional systems can do is take the electoral system-driven heat out of contests, and allow politics to shift in new and unexpected directions.
Notes 1
